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ABSTRACT: Cyberdeviance, intentional use of information technology (IT) in the workplace 
that is contrary to the explicit and implicit norms of the organization, and that threatens the 
well-being of the organization and/or its members, is an important research stream that has 
gained attention in academia and industry. Prior studies have treated different forms of 
cyberdeviance as different phenomena, resulting in a lack of a collective underlying 
conceptualization of cyberdeviance. This work inductively and empirically derives a typology of 
cyberdeviance with 439 respondents across three phases. Our results suggest that cyberdeviance 
varies along 3 dimensions: cyberdeviant behaviors that are minor versus serious; cyberdeviant 
behaviors that target individuals versus organizations; and cyberdeviant behaviors that require 
low versus high technical skill. We thus provide a comprehensive framework that fosters a 
logical linkage of various research programs related to cyberdeviance to guide future research 
investigation. The typology will help managers to distinguish different cyberdeviant behaviors 
and implement suitable interventions depending on the behavior. 
 
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: Cyberdeviance, workplace deviance, typology, systematics 
approach, multidimensional scaling, IS security threats, IS use, cyberslacking, cyberloafing, 
cyberaggression, unauthorized access and use of IT, computer abuse, inductive approach.
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Introduction 
Although information technology (IT) innovations continue to enhance individuals’ lives at 
work and home, they increase vulnerability to harmful deviant activities [1, 11, 22, 30, 75]. A 
diverse array of such behaviors has begun to draw the attention of practitioners because of the 
huge costs incurred by such harmful activities. For instance, the nonwork use of IT in the 
workplace costs U.S. businesses over $60 billion in lost productivity annually [53]. In addition to 
these direct costs, there are indirect costs stemming from lawsuits and diminished brand image, 
consumer loyalty, and trust. Many of these deviant behaviors often go unreported, making the 
actual costs even higher [38, 58]. 
Cyberdeviance is defined as the intentional use of IT in the workplace that is contrary to the 
explicit and implicit norms of the organization, and that threatens the well-being of the 
organization and/or its members. Despite a growing body of work on cyberdeviance, divergent 
conceptualizations of deviant use of IT remain a significant challenge for scholars to 
theoretically advance this important stream of research [11, 22]. Prior research has not focused 
on the nature of deviant IT use behaviors themselves. There is thus a lack of understanding of the 
underlying dimensions of cyberdeviance. In addition, prior research has almost solely focused on 
a particular deviant IT use behavior and is fragmented across the technical, psychological, and 
organizational behavior literature [89]. For instance, Posey et al. [59] suggested that prior studies 
examined information protective behaviors in isolation and there is a lack of understanding of the 
complex psychological processes surrounding the overall superset of behaviors. Similarly, in the 
context of cyberdeviance, previous works treated different forms of deviant IT use as different 
phenomena leading to a separate body of literature for each form of deviant behavior at work 
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[e.g., 22, 32, 54, 67]. To date, there is a lack of an integrative conceptualization of cyberdeviance 
that logically describes and differentiates an overall set of deviant IT use behaviors. 
The growing connectivity, ubiquity, portability, and boundary spanning nature of IT 
exacerbate the potential costs and risks of cyberdeviance [91]. Only recently have organizations 
begun to monitor and regulate employees’ IT use in the workplace, but the effectiveness and 
unintended consequences of such countermeasures are uncertain. One possible explanation is 
that many organizations do not have a complete understanding of cyberdeviant behaviors and the 
threats they pose [89]. As many cyberdeviant activities are not yet recognized, there are few laws 
and regulations governing them or interventions to prevent them. Likewise, research on 
cyberdeviance has seriously lagged practice [66]. In order to provide guidance for practitioners 
to develop effective mitigation and intervention strategies to curb cyberdeviance, there is a need 
to identify the characteristics of different forms of deviant IT use in the workplace. 
The systematics approach [44] has been widely used in the natural sciences (e.g., biology, 
ecology, zoology) to discover the diversity among behaviors and their classifications. This 
approach has also been used among IS researchers [34, 46, 59, 68] with the focus on classifying 
the similarities – and dissimilarities – among objects of interest from which functional studies 
and subsequent theoretical advancements can emerge [80]. For instance, Posey et al. [59] used a 
systematics approach to develop a formal taxonomy and classification schema for protective 
information security behaviors. Such an approach enhances our understanding of the behaviors 
of interest by describing and differentiating an overall set of behaviors [43, 45]. It also provides 
researchers with insight into why findings from research that focus on one or only a subset of 
behaviors may not apply to others [24, 25]. Given the wide range of deviant IT use behaviors in 
the workplace, the area of cyberdeviance can benefit from a systematic investigation by 
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developing an empirically based typology of cyberdeviance. Specifically, the typology will help 
identify the nature of cyberdeviance and place cyberdeviance in the broader theoretical context 
of IT use in the workplace. The typology can assist in the identification of theoretical paradigms 
to study negative use of IT at work. Because little to no empirical research to date has examined 
how cyberdeviant behaviors are related to one another or what dimensions might underlie such 
deviant IT use, the present work breaks new ground for researchers related to IT use. We 
followed both Robinson and Bennett’s [63] approach and a systematics approach [59] to 
inductively and empirically derive a typology of cyberdeviance in 3 phases. In the first phase, we 
elicit a range of cyberdeviant behaviors that are prevalent in the workplace. In the second phase, 
we use multidimensional scaling (MDS) to determine the dimensional structure underlying the 
range of cyberdeviant behaviors. In the third phase, we identify, interpret, and label the resulting 
types of cyberdeviance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first, we present a background on why 
typologies are valuable followed by the conceptualization of cyberdeviance; then, we discuss the 
method followed by results; and, we conclude with a discussion of theoretical and managerial 
contributions. 
Importance of Typologies 
A key problem of cyberdeviance research is the lack of an integrative conceptualization of 
cyberdeviance that logically describes and differentiates various employees’ deviant IT use 
behaviors. Accordingly, we embraced a systematics approach [59] to develop a typology of 
cyberdeviance. A typology provides a comprehensive map of a domain of a phenomenon and the 
ability to understand it with varying degrees of orientation and organization [40]. Typologies 
function as theory and are the most basic type of theory [17, 21, 47]. The construction of 
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typologies is a fundamental aspect of the process of inquiry by means of which the range and 
depth of knowledge with respect to social phenomena can be expanded [47]. To study an area 
that is underdeveloped and that has many unsolved problems, the disciplined construction and 
utilization of typologies are often useful first steps [47, 63]. As research on cyberdeviance is in 
its infancy, a typological classification is vital to comprehend its myriad aspects. Gregor [21] 
notes that there is a need for the development of typologies as a meaningful way to assess new 
constructs and relationships and uncover new patterns in existing relationships in IS research. 
Researchers in the fields of organizational behavior [e.g., 23, 63], strategic management [e.g., 19, 
40], operations management [e.g., 27, 48], and information systems [e.g., 18, 20, 60] have 
developed typologies to understand specific individual or organizational phenomena. Such 
typologies have typically had significant influence on subsequent research in the respective 
domains. 
In the organizational behavior literature, Robinson and Bennett [63] inductively and 
empirically derived a typology of workplace deviance behaviors using MDS. MDS allows 
researchers to produce a typology using the perceptions of a diverse set of individuals who are 
blind to the purpose of a given study. In other words, this approach is less prone to researchers’ 
biases than typologies developed through other methods [63]. Their typology triggered the 
development of common theories of workplace deviance that examine antecedents and 
consequences of various deviance behaviors, resulting in a richer understanding of the 
underlying dynamics of workplace deviance behaviors [e.g., 2, 42, 56, 94]. Likewise, a 
systematic and inductively derived typology of cyberdeviance could be a starting point to 
understand the complex phenomenon of cyberdeviance. 
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Based on our understanding, there is no systematically and empirically derived typology of 
cyberdeviance in the literature. Few attempts have been made to classify highly related 
phenomena, such as work deviance [63] or computer abuse [91]. Willison and Warkentin [91], 
based on previous literature, proposed an IS security threat vector taxonomy. The main purpose 
of their work was to discuss potential research areas for empirical investigation. Robinson and 
Bennett [63] derived a typology of employee deviance with the primary focus on traditional 
deviant behaviors at workplace, such as theft, workplace violence, and loafing. They 
systematically and empirically derived a typology of workplace deviance that varies along 2 
dimensions: minor versus serious and interpersonal versus organizational. We believe that their 
typology provides a useful starting point for us to develop a typology of cyberdeviance. 
Specifically, our investigation and development of a typology of cyberdeviant behaviors will 
provide greater depth while also identifying underlying dimensions. We expect to advance the 
literature by identifying one or more IT-related dimensions in the typology of cyberdeviance. 
Developing a typology of cyberdeviance through a systematics approach is important for 
several reasons. First, it will provide a theoretical framework to study a wide range of 
cyberdeviant behaviors under the broad research stream of cyberdeviance. This will help 
understand various aspects of cyberdeviance and integrate other related research programs by 
illuminating the similarities and differences across various cyberdeviant behaviors. Second, it 
will help identify potential causal relationships and contingency factors associated with the 
relationships. Finally, it will help managers devise effective interventions to mitigate the 
occurrence of cyberdeviant behaviors by evaluating each cyberdeviant behavior independent of 
the others, so that those behaviors with the most frequent occurrence and those that pose the 
greatest threat to organizations and their members can be dealt with first. 
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Conceptualization of Cyberdeviance 
Workplace deviance is defined as “voluntary behavior that violates significant 
organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, 
or both” [63]. Organizational behavior researchers have long investigated deviant behaviors in 
the workplace [e.g., 6, 7, 15, 63, 64]. We build on Robinson and Bennett’s [63] inductive 
approach and conceptualize cyberdeviance as IT use behaviors that violate organizational norms, 
that are intentional, that are performed by the employees, and that are potentially harmful to the 
organization and/or co-workers. 
Determining what are good, right, or moral behaviors is based on the normative perceptions 
that exist in an organization [5, 61]. Norms specify what behaviors are appropriate based on 
whether they conform to the expectations within a particular organization [31, 81], which are 
defined and communicated by the dominant organizational coalition—i.e., leaders and 
executives [10, 64]. Non-conforming behaviors can cause harm to the organization and/or the 
employees in the organization [63]. Hence, cyberdeviance, here, is conceptualized as deviations 
that violate implicit and explicit organizational norms. Implicit norms include supervisors or 
colleagues’ attitude or behavior related to cyberdeviance as well as norms that generally come 
from the organization’s culture, whereas explicit norms include organizational control and 
policies for cyberdeviance. 
Although there could be unintentional and unconscious acts of negative IT use that are not 
under one’s volitional control, our conceptualization of cyberdeviance specifically deals with 
intentional and purposeful actions performed by employees. The characteristics of actions are 
also important features of our conceptualization of cyberdeviance. Our conceptualization of 
cyberdeviance focuses on at the intent to perform the behavior rather than the intent to cause 
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harm. Hence, the focus is on IT use itself regardless of whether it results in harmful 
consequences for individuals and/or organizations. Although cyberdeviant behaviors can be 
performed by outsiders to the organization, our conceptualization focuses on employees within 
the organization. Similarly, although cyberdeviance can be targeted toward individuals and 
institutions outside the organization, our conceptualization of cyberdeviance is aimed at objects 
within the organization. 
Prior Studies on Cyberdeviance 
The scope of cyberdeviance in organizations is quite broad. The deviant use of IT ranges 
from relatively benign behaviors, such as Internet browsing, listening to music, and nonwork 
emailing, to more damaging or illegal behaviors, such as illegal downloading, IT sabotage, 
hacking and unauthorized entry into co-workers or supervisors’ computers. Appendix A 
summarizes key studies from 1997 to 20181 published in leading IS journals—i.e., Information 
Systems Research, Journal of the Association for Information Systems, Journal of Management 
Information Systems, and MIS Quarterly—related to the deviant use of IT in the workplace. This 
summary provides an overview of the prior IS research on the topic. Specifically, these journals 
have published papers investigating the risks from intentional activities, such as software piracy 
[e.g., 50, 54], cyberloafing [e.g., 32], malicious insider attacks [e.g., 35], data or identity theft 
[e.g., 3], and unethical IT use [e.g., 11, 67]. However, prior IS works have not been logically 
integrated in an overarching framework [89]. Similarly, there is no systematically and 
empirically derived typology of cyberdeviance in the organizational behavior literature. Prior 
studies have almost solely focused on one particular type of cyberdeviance. For example, Lim 
[36] used the social exchange and organizational justice perspectives to explain employees’ 
                                               
1 Articles published or available as forthcoming in 2018 at the time of submission of this version of the paper are 
included. 
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engagement in cyberloafing (or cyberslacking). Weatherbee and Kelloway [88] studied 
cyberaggression, with a focus on interpersonal aggression at work. 
Method 
The main purpose of this work is to develop a typology of cyberdeviance. We followed 
Robinson and Bennett’s approach [63] to inductively develop a typology of cyberdeviance in 3 
phases. This approach is inductive and grounded in nature. By casting the net wide (wider than 
may have been done in the previous research), we allow the dimensions that emerge to be 
grounded in actual experience. Figure 1 depicts the 3-phase typology development process. The 
natural starting point for a systematics approach is to derive the major behaviors that comprise 
the typology. Thus, the objective of phase 1 was to derive the range of cyberdeviant behaviors 
that are prevalent in the workplace. To accomplish this, focus group interviews were conducted 
to elicit different cyberdeviant behaviors. Then, a systematics approach guided us to understand 
how behaviors were related to each other. The objective of phase 2 was to position the behaviors 
elicited in phase 1 within an n-dimensional space using MDS. Specifically, a different group of 
participants rated how similar or different each elicited cyberdeviant behavior was from the 
others. MDS was then used to derive the spatial configuration of the cyberdeviant behaviors 
based on the similarity/dissimilarity ratings to produce the n-dimensional taxonomy. The 
objective of phase 3 was to create meaningful labels for the different dimensions identified in 
phase 2. Specifically, a different group of participants provided labels for the dimensions and 
rated how each cyberdeviant behavior fits with the label descriptors. MDS-based regression 
analysis was then performed to derive the final labels that describe each dimension. The use of 
different participants in each of the phases of the study minimized participant bias and carryover 
effects. The procedures and ensuing results for each phase of the study are discussed next. 
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Figure 1. The 3-phase Typology Development Process 
 
Phase 1: Focus Group Interviews to Elicit Cyberdeviant Behavior Incidents 
Participants 
We sent an invitation to 525 employees of a Fortune 100 company to participate in this phase 
of the research. The supervisor forwarded our email invitation to his/her subordinates. The email 
stated that we sought volunteers to participate in an interactive group discussion forum about 
different ways they use IT. Of these 525 employees, 134 employees agreed to participate, thus 
resulting in a response rate of 26%. Of the 134 participants, 59% of the participants were men 
and the average age was 39. All participants were working full-time, the average tenure with the 
company was 7 years, and 106 participants had at least an undergraduate degree. Various job 
functions and business units were represented, thus helping us to obtain diverse viewpoints. 
Procedure 
Focus group sessions were conducted over a 3-day period on-site at 2 different locations of 
the company in a large metropolitan area in the U.S. We followed the guidelines and suggestions 
provided by Morgan [51] to conduct the focus group sessions. Participants were divided into 9 
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groups and each session was restricted to no more than 20 people, the number of participants in 
each group ranged between 12 and 18. Three focus group sessions were conducted each day 
between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., and each session lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour. At 
the beginning of each focus group session, the specific activities of the session were explained to 
the participants. Participants did not have prior knowledge about the research or the activities of 
the session. The moderator (one of the authors) followed a script to moderate the basic dialog of 
all sessions. The script was created to include no value judgments and aimed to be unbiased. A 
co-moderator, who was not involved in the research, kept track of time, facilitated the 
discussions, and took notes as needed. The facilitation of the discussion by the co-moderator who 
did not know the research or its objectives allowed the discussion to be free-flowing and yet not 
be steered in any particular direction that could be construed as biased. Participants were first 
given a sheet of paper and were asked to list at least 2 incidents of someone using IT 
inappropriately at work in the organization and briefly describe why they thought it was 
inappropriate. Each participant was then asked to describe the incidents followed by an open 
discussion of the complete list of incidents and why they were inappropriate behaviors. 
Participants were asked to share their views and not required to reach agreement. Every 
participant listed at least 2 incidents and the number of incidents listed by participants ranged 
from 2 to 12 across the 9 sessions. At the end of each session, a summary of the discussion was 
provided to the participants and they were asked to confirm that the summary was an accurate 
representation of the discussion. They were then given an opportunity to add any other ideas or 
provide comments prior to the end of the session. Based on the focus group sessions, a total of 
132 statements describing cyberdeviant behaviors were compiled for further evaluation. As we 
asked our participants to state the cyberdeviant behaviors that others have performed in this 
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phase, we believe that this approach encourages participants to honestly voice their opinions and 
eliminate the fear of being stigmatized or being subject to social desirability bias. 
Next, a group of 15 judges comprising doctoral students and faculty members in a U.S. 
business school, who did not have any prior knowledge about the current study, were asked to 
independently evaluate the 132 cyberdeviant statements. Specifically, the judges were asked to 
check for redundancy and verbosity, to paraphrase or remove statements as needed, and to make 
sure the statements were inclusive enough to be generalized across different populations and 
organizations. The judges were also given the definition of cyberdeviance and asked to rate each 
of the behaviors on the extent to which they fit the definition of cyberdeviance. Specifically, the 
judges separately rated whether these behaviors were voluntary, violated general organizational 
norms, and were potentially harmful to organizations and/or employees. Here are some examples 
of discarded items: collecting other employees’ discarded printouts from the trash; contributing 
content to hate websites; indulging in activities that violate consumer privacy; printing big files 
(hundreds of pages) from work printers that are not work related; scanning personal pictures 
using a scanner at work; stealing other employees’ printouts. The authors checked the 
consistency of the results from the 15 judges and finalized a list of 54 cyberdeviant behaviors 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1. List of Cyberdeviant Behaviors 
No. Statement 
1 Sending/receiving personal emails through work email system 
2 Sending spam, chain, and mass emails through work email system 
3 Sending/receiving personal instant messages through work instant messaging system 
4 Harassing co-workers through emails and instant messages 
5 Using unauthorized applications 
6 Harming other computers and systems by sending big attachments, videos, music, etc.  
7 Accessing pornography content 
8 Downloading personal content into work computers 
9 Downloading malicious content into work computers 
10 Browsing away work time 
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11 Browsing unsanctioned websites 
12 Browsing websites for personal purposes 
13 Causing harm to work computer resources 
14 Accessing illegal content 
15 Gambling online 
16 Listening to music, video, and webcast 
17 Storing and retrieving personal files on work computers 
18 Playing computer games 
19 Playing online games 
20 Accessing violent and hatred content 
21 Stealing hardware and software resources 
22 Access and intrusion to work computers and servers that are not authorized 
23 Illegal copying and distributing licensed electronic materials 
24 Listening to music (CDs, files on computers) 
25 Damaging and destroying computer resources 
26 Hacking and enabling outsiders to hack work computers 
27 Smearing the company online through emails/discussion boards  
28 Whistle blowing about the company electronically 
29 Spreading rumors and gossips about co-workers electronically 
30 Job search using company computer resources 
31 Concealing identity online and deceiving co-workers 
32 Deleting/modifying electronic company files, codes, data, etc.  
33 Deceiving customers by falsifying information 
34 Engaging in identity theft 
35 Provide/distribute access to individuals not authorized to access 
36 Selling company technology resources and making profit  
37 Unauthorized access to co-workers’ computers 
38 Using company resources to engage in march madness, fantasy football, etc. 
39 Making unauthorized Internet phone calls 
40 Posting company information, files, code online for public access 
41 Monitoring co-workers’ use of computer resources 
42 Harassing co-workers online in public 
43 Engaging in personal business using work computer resources 
44 Taking the data hostage or encrypting the data without permission 
45 Destroying and damaging computer resources 
46 Downloading files, code off the Internet and using it at work 
47 Sniffing the network resources to find holes in networks 
48 
 
Using external non-work-related ISPs/proxy servers to connect to the Internet from 
work 
49 Electronic copyright violations 
50 Electronic intellectual property violations 
51 Playing loud music on the computer 
52 Providing computers and software to employees with harmful content 
53 Competing with the company in buying/selling/accessing technology resources 
54 Unauthorized installation and use software/hardware components 
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Phase 2: MDS of Cyberdeviant Behavior Incidents 
Participants 
Two hundred and forty employees across 5 different organizations2 in the southeastern U.S. 
participated in phase 2. Emails were sent to 750 employees across all 5 organizations, each from 
1 of 5 different industries, i.e., retailing, telecommunication, logistics, marketing, and 
transportation, using a list maintained by a research center at a U.S. university. A total of 240 
participants, with an average age of 36 and working full-time, volunteered and participated in 
this study. Of the participants, 107 were women. All participants completed all the tasks, thus 
resulting in a response rate of 32%. 
Procedure 
The first step in deriving the typology using MDS was to create the psychological distances 
between behaviors. This was accomplished by specifying how similar or different each behavior 
was from the other behaviors. Each respondent was asked to rate a different set of 100 randomly 
generated pairs of statements from the 54 statements generated in the previous phase. 
Specifically, participants rated the degree of similarity or difference among each pair of 
statements using a 9-point Likert-type scale (1=very similar, 9=very different) in an online 
environment. For example, a participant might rate the degree of similarity/difference between 
“engaging in identity theft” and “sending personal emails”. As there are n(n-1)/2 total pairs 
across all 54 statements (where n=54), the resulting 1,431 possible comparisons was deemed to 
be too cognitively demanding and complex for the respondents to process. Respondents could be 
asked to rate all possible comparisons in an MDS study, but prior research has typically used a 
subset of all possible comparisons to reduce the complexity of the task [e.g., 55, 63]. Using a 
subset of statement pairs has been shown to reduce respondent burnout, errors, and attrition, but 
                                               
2 All 5 organizations had at least 1,000 employees and 3 of the 5 belonged to the Fortune 500.  
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not have any adverse effect on the findings [63, 76]. Hence, we asked participants to rate 100 
pairs of statements. The participants were then asked to specify the criteria that they used for 
their ratings. 
The next step was to interpret the number of underlying dimensions that provide an optimal 
fit for the data. This was accomplished by deriving the spatial configuration of the various 
cyberdeviant behaviors on the basis of the perceived difference from the other behaviors as rated 
by the respondents. The greater the differences (i.e., higher the ratings on the pairs) between the 
cyberdeviant behaviors, the greater was the distance between them in the spatial configuration. 
First, a matrix of dissimilarities (54x54) among the cyberdeviant behaviors was constructed 
based on the ratings provided by the respondents. Next, a metric MDS analysis was conducted to 
create dimensional configurations related to 1, 2, 3, and 4 dimensions [33]. The metric MDS is a 
method for constructing the geometric configuration of the different dimensions based on the 
Euclidian distances [see 13, 33] among the cyberdeviant behaviors in a spatial spectrum. 
Results 
The metric MDS analysis was performed using the ALSCAL program in SPSS. Two fit 
indexes—stress index and distance correlation—were used to analyze the underlying dimensions 
created by the metric MDS analysis. The fit indexes are objective functions that represent the 
extent to which the derived configuration fit with the data. Specifically, the indexes show 
whether a particular n-dimensional configuration fits the cyberdeviant behaviors better than other 
n-dimensional configurations. Stress index is the square root of the normalized residual sum of 
squares for the dimensional solution and may have values from 0 to 1 and determines which 
dimensional configuration explains the most variance [33]. Given the various cyberdeviant 
behaviors, the smallest possible value of the stress index without an appreciable decline in stress 
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from 1 n-dimensional configuration to an n+1-dimensional configuration is determined. A scree 
plot of the stress indexes for all the dimensional solutions was created to assess the decline in 
stress indexes across the n-dimensional space. A scree plot is particularly useful when dealing 
with comparisons larger than 30 [33]. The second fit index, the distance correlation (R2), 
provides the correlation between the transformed data and the distances provided by MDS, i.e., 
the higher the value of R2, the better the fit. 
Based on the dimension heuristic suggested by Kruskal and Wish [33], the stress indexes for 
1, 2, 3, and 4 dimensions were assessed. The 1-dimensional configuration had a stress index of 
.43 and R2 of .49; the 2-dimensional configuration had a stress index of .39 and R2 of .56; the 3-
dimensional configuration had a stress index of .26 and R2 of .70; and the 4-dimensional 
configuration had a stress index of .22 and R2 of .71. The stress index had a moderate drop from 
the 1-dimensional to the 2-dimensional configuration, a noticeable drop from the 2-dimensional 
to the 3-dimensional configuration, and leveled off from the 3-dimensional to the 4-dimensional 
configuration. The R2 for the configurations also leveled off from the 3-dimensional to the 4-
dimensional configuration. The scree plot also suggested that the stress indexes leveled off after 
the 3-dimensional configuration. The results indicated that the 3-dimensional typology provided 
the most parsimonious and definitive solution. 
Phase 3: Interpreting and Labeling Typology Categories 
Participants 
Participants in this phase comprised 4 doctoral students and 46 full-time MBA students, with 
an average of 5 years of prior work experience. The average age was 32. The participants were 
informed about the activities a week prior to the session. 
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Procedure 
As mentioned in the phase 2 discussion earlier, the respondents in phase 2, when rating the 
similarities or differences among the behaviors, also indicated the criteria (why they think the 
behaviors are similar or different) they used to provide the similarity/difference ratings. First, the 
4 doctoral students, blind to the study, acted as judges and were asked to evaluate the criteria, 
and paraphrase and simplify them. For example, one of the respondents (from phase 2) specified 
that “I looked at them to see if they were similar in the degree of harm, risk potential in terms of 
how they can hurt different stakeholders in the company” and one of the judges had paraphrased 
the statement as harming different stakeholders and another judge had paraphrased the statement 
as seriously hurting the co-workers. The judges were then asked to provide potential labels or 
attributes that best describe the criteria by creating bi-polar indicators. The judges created 7 bi-
polar descriptors based on the top 7 criteria: serious - not serious, harmful to individuals - not 
harmful to individuals, harmful to organization - not harmful to organization, moral - immoral, 
visible to others - not visible to others, low technical skill required - high technical skill required, 
useful to the individual - not useful to the individual. Then, the 46 MBA students rated each of 
the 54 cyberdeviant behaviors on each of the bi-polar descriptors using a 9-point Likert-type 
scale. For example, one of the bi-polar descriptors ranged from “this behavior is not harmful to 
organizations” (1) to “this behavior is harmful to organizations” (9). 
Results 
The first step toward the interpretation of the dimensions was to specify the average of the 
MBA respondents’ ratings of the 54 behaviors on each of the 7 bi-polar descriptors. Regression 
analysis was then performed to determine the relationship between the mean ratings of each 
cyberdeviant behavior along each bi-polar descriptor—i.e., the ratings of the MBA students—
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and the 3-dimensional configuration—i.e., stimulus coordinates for every behavior on the 3 
dimensions. The mean ratings were the dependent variables and the coordinates of the 
configuration were the independent variables in the regression model. The coordinates3 were the 
actual position—i.e., distance from the origin—of the cyberdeviant behaviors in the 3-
dimensional configuration. The regression specifically tests to see if the bi-polar indicators have 
a relationship to the position of the cyberdeviant behaviors in the 3-dimensional space such that 
the bi-polar indicators can be linked to the 3 dimensions. The final bi-polar labels will be chosen 
based on the squared multiple correlations and the beta weights from the regression analysis. A 
bi-polar descriptor having a high squared multiple correlation in relation to the stimulus 
coordinates and a high beta weight on a specific dimension can be considered as a descriptor for 
that dimension. The regression line corresponding to each of the bi-polar descriptors is in the 
form:                                              
a + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x3 
where b1, b2, and b3 are the beta coefficients or cosine values of the angle between the 
regression line and each of the dimensional axes; and x1, x2, and x3 are the coordinates of the 
cyberdeviant behavior in the three-dimensional space. 
In interpreting the dimensions and their respective bi-polar indicators, the multiple 
correlations must be high—i.e., variance explaining the bi-polar descriptor by the coordinates—
and the regression weights should be high—i.e., the angle between the dimensional axis and the 
regression line representing the bi-polar indicator is small [33]. Table 2 shows the results. 
 
 
                                               
3 Each behavior on the 3-dimensional space will have 3 coordinates corresponding to their position in the space. For 
example, say the 3 coordinates are x, y and z. Then, each of the 54 statements will correspond to a point in the 3-
dimensional space (xi, yi, zi), where i ranges from 1 to 54.  
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Table 2. Results of Regression for the Dimensions for Bi-polar Descriptors 
Bi-polar descriptors Regression weights Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Dimension 
1 
Dimension 
2 
Dimension 
3 
Minor-serious 0.77 0.34 -0.16 0.76 
Harmful to organization-not harmful to organization 0.42 0.67 0.39 0.64 
Harmful to individuals-not harmful to individuals -0.46 -0.71 0.21 0.72 
Moral-Immoral 0.32 -0.41 0.07 0.51 
Visible to others-not visible to others -0.23 -0.03 -0.11 0.30 
Low technical skill-high technical skill required 0.38 0.36 -0.80 0.84 
Useful to the individual-not useful to the individual -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 0.22 
 
Dimension 1. The largest regression weight on the first dimension was .77 (a regression 
weight of .77 corresponds to an angle of 40 degrees as cosine (40°) = .77) associated with the 
minor - serious bi-polar indicator and the corresponding squared multiple correlation was .76. 
This dimension was hence related to the minor - serious bi-polar indicator. Specifically, it 
suggested that one of the underlying dimensions for classifying cyberdeviant behaviors is 
whether the particular cyberdeviant behavior was minor or serious. Consequently, we labeled the 
first dimension “minor versus serious cyberdeviance.” 
Dimension 2. The most significant regression weight on the second dimension was -.71 on 
the harmful to individual - not harmful to individual bi-polar indicator and the corresponding 
value of squared multiple correlation was .72. The bi-polar indicator harmful to organization - 
not harmful to organization also had a high coefficient for this dimension (.67) with a multiple 
correlation coefficient of .64. As the bi-polar indicators harmful - not harmful to individual and 
harmful - not harmful to organization had relationships with dimension 2 in opposite directions 
(one was positive and the other was negative) and given both had high beta weight and multiple 
correlation on the same dimension, dimension 2 was a combined bi-polar indicator of harmful to 
organizations or individuals. Specifically, it suggested that one of the underlying dimensions for 
classifying cyberdeviant behaviors was whether the particular cyberdeviant behavior was 
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harmful to individuals or the organization. Collectively, we labeled this dimension “individual 
versus organizational cyberdeviance.” 
Dimension 3. The most significant regression weight on the third dimension was -.80 on the 
low technical skill - high technical skill required bi-polar indicator and the corresponding 
squared multiple correlation was .84. This suggested that one of the underlying dimensions for 
classifying cyberdeviant behaviors was whether or not one needed strong technical skill to 
engage in cyberdeviance. We, therefore, labeled the third dimension “low technical skill versus 
high technical skill cyberdeviance.” 
Figure 2 provides the 3-dimensional configuration of the taxonomy of cyberdeviance. Each 
axis in the configuration represents the 3 dimensions along with their respective bi-polar 
indicators. Observation of the 3-dimensional configuration supports the use of the above labels. 
Table 3 shows typical behaviors in each dimension in the typology.  
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Figure 2. Three-Dimensional Typology of Cyberdeviance 
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Table 3. Typical Behaviors in Each Dimensional Configuration in the Typology* 
  Individual Organizational 
M
in
or
 
Low technical skill Low technical skill 
• Spreading rumors and gossips about co-workers 
electronically 
• Sending spam and mass email messages 
• Playing music loud on computers 
• Sending/receiving personal emails 
• Browsing away work time 
• Playing computer games 
 
High technical skill High technical skill 
• Concealing identity online and deceiving co-
workers 
• Monitoring co-workers’ use of computer resources 
• Providing damaged computer resources to 
employees 
• Using external ISPs/proxy servers to connect to 
the Internet from work 
• Engaging in computer rage 
• Unauthorized installation of hardware and 
software in company computers 
  Individual Organizational 
Se
ri
ou
s 
Low technical skill High technical skill 
• Harassing co-workers through emails and instant 
messages 
• Distributing pornography content to co-workers 
• Distributing violent and hatred content online 
• Posting critical company information online 
• Smearing the company online 
• Stealing company hardware and software 
resources 
High technical skill High technical skill 
• Unauthorized access to co-workers’ computers 
• Engaging in identity theft 
• Concealing identity and deceiving co-workers 
 
• Spreading virus in work computers 
• Hacking and intrusion into computer resources 
• Encrypting company data and taking data hostage 
*These lists are not exhaustive. We provide some typical behaviors for each combination for illustrative 
purposes only. 
 
Discussion 
This work builds on an emerging stream of research on deviant use of IT in the workplace 
and develops a typology of cyberdeviance in a 3-phase research study. Following Robinson and 
Bennett [63] and a systematics approach [59], we inductively developed a typology of 
cyberdeviance with 3 dimensions, namely “minor versus serious”, “individual versus 
organizational” and “low technical versus high technical skill”, suggesting that cyberdeviant 
behaviors can be categorized based on whether they are minor or serious in nature, whether they 
affect the individuals or organizations, and whether low or high technical skill is required to 
engage in cyberdeviance. The results share some similarities with the typology of workplace 
deviance, but is unique in terms of the IT-specific dimension (i.e., low technical versus high 
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technical skill required). Based on the different combinations of the 3 dimensions, there are 8 
categories of cyberdeviant behaviors. The categories can be connected to 4 existing streams of 
research in prior literature, namely cyberslacking, computer abuse, unauthorized access and use 
of IT, and cyberaggression. 
Cyberslacking (or cyberloafing) refers to nonwork personal use of IT [90]. The categories of 
“A minor form of organizationally oriented deviant use of IT with low technical skill” and “A 
serious form of organizationally oriented deviant use of IT with low technical skill” are 
connected to cyberslacking. Some researchers considered cyberslacking as a form of “production 
deviance” [36] that can be accomplished relatively easily. This form of counterproductive 
workplace behavior [28, 52] can distract employees, thus affecting their productivity. All deviant 
IT use behaviors (e.g., “sending/receiving personal emails and instant messages”, “browsing 
websites for personal purposes”, “listening to the music on the computer”, “playing computer 
games”) identified in the category of “A minor form of organizationally oriented deviant use of 
IT with low technical skill” are nonwork personal use of IT that affect productivity. Further, the 
results show that this form of cyberdeviance requires low technical skill, supporting the 
assumption of cyberslacking that is easy to perform. Some researchers, however, considered 
cyberslacking as a form of “property deviance” [9] that suggests that deviant IT use behaviors 
have the potential for consuming organizational resources (e.g., network or software). The 
deviant IT use behaviors (e.g., “accessing pornography content”, “accessing violent and hatred 
content”, “playing online games”) identified in the category of “A serious form of 
organizationally oriented deviant use of IT with low technical skill” are nonwork personal use of 
IT that can be easily performed but seriously drain organizational computing networks and 
bandwidth [87]. 
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To conclude, cyberslacking is generally regarded as organizationally oriented deviant IT use 
with low technical skill required. The “production deviance” type of cyberslacking usually has 
minor impacts to the organization, whereas the “property deviance” type of cyberslacking has 
more serious impacts on the organization. These 2 types of cyberslacking behaviors have been 
well-studied in the organizational behavior literature [e.g., 36, 52, 95] but not in the mainstream 
IS literature (except [32]). 
Computer abuse is a distinct stream of IS research that primarily focused on issues related to 
computer security, privacy, and fraud [39, 49, 70, 71, 91]. According to our review of papers 
published in leading IS journals (see Appendix A), most prior IS studies focused on this form of 
cyberdeviance [e.g., 3, 11, 35], probably because of its serious impact on organizations. All 
deviant IT use behaviors (e.g., “hacking and intrusions into computer resources”, “accessing 
illegal content”, “stealing customer information and deceiving customers”, “spreading virus in 
work computers”) identified in the category of “A serious form of organizationally oriented 
deviant use of IT with high technical skill” is connected with the computer abuse literature. This 
stream of research has paid attention to serious IT-related criminal behaviors [e.g., 16] that target 
organizations. Further, most studies in this area have investigated control mechanisms intended 
to deter computer crimes [e.g., 4, 26, 49, 71, 72, 91]. This literature argues that computer crimes 
committed by employees can be prevented by sanctions and countermeasures [72], such as 
monitoring technology use [70], providing security awareness education and training [4], and 
strictly enforcing IT use policies and code of ethics [26]. Studies in this area are well-established 
and systematically organized in the IS literature [e.g., 37, 91]. 
Unauthorized access and use of IT refers to the violation of the right to access and use IT 
resources in organizations. All deviant IT use behaviors (e.g., “making unauthorized Internet 
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phone calls”, “unauthorized installation of hardware and software in company computers”, 
“using external ISPs/proxy servers to connect to the Internet from work”) identified in the 
category of “A minor form of organizationally oriented deviant use of IT with high technical 
skill” is connected with the IS literature on unauthorized access and use. Similar to the computer 
abuse literature, existing works in IS mainly focused on interventions to reduce the violations of 
IT access and use in a nonintrusive manner [e.g., 82]. 
Cyberaggression represents a constellation of offensive behaviors and attitudes intending to 
intimidate, harass, or threaten a co-worker [57]. Cyberaggression has been extensively 
researched in prior research [e.g., 12, 14, 41, 69, 73]. However, most of these studies only 
focused on how cyberaggression negatively affected job performance and other task-related 
outcomes in the workplace [88]. Researchers seldom look at this form of cyberdeviance from the 
degree of impact (i.e., minor versus serious) and the technical skill required (i.e., low technical 
skill versus high technical skill). Compared with other forms of cyberdeviance, cyberaggression 
has been less systematically investigated in the IS literature.  
Theoretical Implications 
This work contributes to the IS literature in several ways. First, whereas a significantly large 
portion of the IS literature has been directed toward examining positive IT use, both in the 
workplace and society [65, 86], this work provided a parsimonious typology of cyberdeviance 
that can guide future research on negative use of IT at work. Recently, scholars in IS have argued 
for a rich conceptualization of system use by including the different patterns of IT use [62, 74, 
86, 96]. Our typology will enable researchers to understand the relationships among the different 
types and subsequently, among the different behaviors. For example, all cyberdeviance behaviors 
that are potentially harmful to the organizations can be examined together to understand the 
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commonalities across them. This will in turn help develop a general theory of cyberdeviance by 
examining behaviors within and across the dimensions.  
Second, we note that this work benefitted from using a systematics approach [59]. 
Specifically, we followed both Robinson and Bennett’s [63] approach and a systematics 
approach [59] to inductively develop a typology of cyberdeviance in 3 phases. We identified that 
cyberdeviance varied along 3 dimensions and integrated numerous deviant IT use behaviors into 
a framework. The typology derived here makes a contribution to the literature by empirically 
validating the existing literature on workplace deviance and adding a new dimension that is IT-
specific. In addition, our typology identified the underlying dimensions of cyberdeviance and 
thus clarified not only the different categories of deviant IT use behaviors, but also how these 
categories were related to one another. For example, our typology indicated that computer abuse 
behaviors, such as IT security and privacy violations, can be theoretically placed under the type 
of cyberdeviance that were serious, required high technical skill, and were harmful to 
organizations. Similarly, the typology illustrated that cyberslacking can be theoretically placed 
under the subset of behaviors that are minor and require low technical skill. To determine 
whether a cyberslacking behavior was a production-deviant or property-deviant activity, the 
degree of harm to organizations (minor versus serious) was an important indicator. 
Third, this typology is useful in the development of general theories of cyberdeviance. 
Particularly, it created meaningful patterns out of the wide range of cyberdeviant behaviors by 
allowing us to describe and differentiate deviant IT use behaviors. It also facilitated integrating 
and positioning prior streams of research in the framework. Further, the typology allowed us to 
connect to the existing literature and understand the research status of various forms of 
cyberdeviance. For instance, the results clearly suggested that several deviant IT use behaviors 
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(e.g., cyberslacking, cyberaggression) have not been systematically investigated in the IS 
literature. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are some limitations of this work that should be noted. The list of cyberdeviant 
behaviors generated was based on a single organization and the behaviors may differ in other 
organizations or organizations in other industries. However, employees from a wide range of job 
functions from software developers to administrative assistants and from various business units 
participated in the study that suggest that the results could potentially generalize across different 
populations. Further, as one of the authors was directly involved in the data collection, the biases 
of the researcher might have influenced the findings. However, the author followed a strict and 
unbiased script with no value statements, thus minimizing this concern; further, we believe that 
the use of multiple participants and multiple judges in each phase of the study minimized bias. 
Another limitation was that respondents in phase 2 of the study evaluated only 100 pairs of 
behaviors. This made it difficult to render each individual’s overall dimensional configuration, 
which requires all respondents to rate all possible pairs of behavior. As each individual’s 
dimensional configuration might have been different, it could have been useful to understand the 
individual assessment of the different dimensions. However, as noted earlier, in addition to the 
prohibitive number of statement pairs as a constraint, prior research has consistently 
demonstrated that such use of subsets of pairs had no effect on the dimensional configuration. 
Future research can build on our typology to investigate the motivations and consequences of 
the various categories of cyberdeviance. For instance, what are the motivations (or 
consequences) that are unique to specific cells in the typology? Existing theories or prior 
research could be most useful for this future research direction, which went as far as establishing 
  30 
the typology, leaving an unanswered question: what are the motivational factors (or the diverse 
negative consequences) of these cyberdeviance behaviors and what is their generality and/or 
specificity relative to the typology categories? 
Although we expect that the nature of the cyberdeviant behavior remains similar, the 
technologies involved may change over time because of the emergence of new technologies. For 
example, we identified that “sending/receiving personal emails” as one form of 
cyberslacking/cyberloafing behavior. The use of personal emails may become less often as 
people are changing the way they communicate with each other. Most people are now relying on 
instant messaging or social networking sites for instant communication rather than using emails. 
Future research should continue to explore how cyberdeviant behaviors change over time—these 
changes can be triggered in a variety of ways that include the evolution of platforms that may 
even create new paradigms of applications [see 93]. More broadly, given that technologies are 
used for productive purposes even outside the workplace [see 77] suggests the need to 
understand nonwork behaviors in a holistic way. As such investigations get underway, key 
contingencies, ranging from individual demographics to situational, cultural or psychological 
variables, will be important to incorporate [83, 84, 85, 92]. 
Managerial and Public Policy Implications 
This work has important implications for managers. The typology developed here provided a 
comprehensive categorization of various cyberdeviant behaviors that were prevalent in the 
workplace. Our typology can potentially help managers to distinguish between various 
cyberdeviant behaviors and focus on the behaviors that have potentially serious outcomes first. 
The typology can help managers implement interventions based on the different subtypes of 
cyberdeviance. As each cyberdeviant behavior is largely different from other cyberdeviant 
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behaviors, different interventions can be designed to curb different behaviors. For example, 
monitoring can be implemented to curb serious behaviors, such as breaching the security or 
hacking, whereas some sort of incentive-based interventions can be implemented for more 
benign behaviors, such as cyberslacking. 
Given the increase in cyberdeviance and the potential for more serious violations using IT, 
organizations are being asked to produce electronic artifacts, such as email and instant messages 
logs, in courts for legal proceedings and liabilities are becoming a cause for concern. In fact, 
damage from cyberdeviance and the potential liability for deviant IT use behaviors has become 
such a common occurrence that third-party insurance, popularly known as cyberinsurance, is 
flourishing [88, 97]. An implication for practice is that the typology can help disseminate the 
seriousness of the behaviors and potential for damage, which can be used in writing 
cyberinsurance policies. The typology can also help system designers to build better systems that 
prevent users from engaging in cyberdeviance. The dimensional attribute of low versus high 
technical skill supports the notion that different systems can be used for different cyberdeviant 
behaviors and hence, features of a specific system can be designed based on the type of 
cyberdeviant behaviors that users are more likely to engage in using that particular system. 
The current work also has important implications for public policy. Judicial and legislative 
systems in the U.S. are now increasingly dealing with cases involving a wide range of IT-
enabled deviant behaviors, including sexual harassment, theft, discrimination, financial frauds, 
spamming, hacking, illegal pornography, espionage, and sabotage [29, 78]. Laws for IT-based 
offenses have also been strengthened in the last decade or so. Many terms, such as cyberstalking, 
cyberextortion, and cyberharrasment, have been coined and are used as official judicial parlance 
for prosecution [79]. However, the technological advances and the sophistication in computer 
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crimes have limited the ability to carefully identify the victims, assess the damages, prosecute the 
perpetrators and most importantly, prevent the crimes. Legislation and enactment of statutes have 
typically occurred only after the computer crimes have been committed [79]. This typology can 
serve as a starting point and guide a discourse to prevent such crimes. 
Cyberdeviance has also permeated into social, economic, educational, and political 
landscapes. Senators have resigned and political parties have been maligned getting caught up in 
cyberdeviant activities; innocent victims of IT-based sexual harassment have committed suicide; 
racially charged emails have been sent to minority students; and students have bullied other 
students via emails. This typology can guide public policy development by helping government 
and judicial systems in devising laws that govern the misuse of IT. 
Conclusions 
Despite the increased prevalence of cyberdeviance, researchers and practitioners have yet 
to gain a comprehensive understanding of this problem, which is vital in today’s workplace. This 
work examined deviant IT use behaviors in the workplace and developed a typology of 
cyberdeviance in a 3-phase study. We used both Robinson and Bennett’s [63] approach and a 
systematics approach [59] to inductively develop a typology that allowed us to connect the 
previously fragmented streams of research on various forms of cyberdeviant behaviors. As 
previously developed typologies across different fields of study have had a profound impact 
[e.g., 8, 18, 20, 60, 63] on advancing knowledge in the respective areas, we believe our typology 
can pave the way for a new line of inquiry in IS research regarding cyberdeviant behaviors and 
help in advancing our limited understanding of cyberdeviance. Our typology will also help 
managers to distinguish different types of cyberdeviant behaviors and focus organizational 
resources on curbing those that have potentially serious negative consequences. It will also help 
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managers to devise and implement interventions based on the attributes of the subtypes of 
cyberdeviance. 
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Appendix A: Prior Studies of Negative IT Use in the Workplace from ISR, JAIS, JMIS and 
MISQ (1997 to 2018) 
Authors Journal Topic Theory Research Design Technology 
Addas and 
Pinsonneault [1] 
MISQ E-mail interruptions Action regulation 
theory 
Survey; diary E-mail 
Anandarajan [2] JMIS Nonwork web surfing Artificial intelligence-
based model 
Survey; design 
science 
Web 
Angst et al. [3] MISQ Data security breach Institutional theory Archival data IT security 
technologies in 
hospitals 
Ayyagari et al. 
[4] 
MISQ Technostress The person–
environment fit model 
 
Survey NONE 
Banerjee et al. 
[5] 
MISQ IT ethics behavior Theory of planned 
behavior 
Survey NONE 
Barlow et al. [6] JAIS Information security 
compliance 
Anti-neutralization, 
informational, and 
normative 
communication 
approaches 
Survey NONE 
Bulgurcu et al. 
[7] 
MISQ Information security 
policy compliance 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
Survey NONE 
Chidambaram 
and Tung [8] 
ISR Social loafing Social impact theory Experiment Technology-
supported groups 
Culnan and 
Williams [9] 
MISQ Data breach NONE Case study NONE 
D'Arcy et al. [10] ISR IS misuse Extended deterrence 
theory model 
Survey Computers at work 
 
George et al. [11] JAIS Deception Interpersonal deception 
theory 
Experiment Group support 
systems 
Guo et al. [12] JMIS Nonmalicious security 
violation 
The composite 
behavior model 
A scenario-based 
survey 
NONE 
Gwebu et al. [13] JMIS Data breach Cognitive dissonance 
theory 
Event study NONE 
Hu et al. [14] JMIS Information security 
violations 
Self-control theory Scenario-based 
laboratory 
experiments 
NONE 
Jensen et al. [15] JMIS Phishing Mindfulness theory Experiment E-mail 
Johnston and 
Warkentin [16] 
MISQ Information security 
behavior 
Protection motivation 
theory; fear appeal 
theories 
Experiment Anti-spyware 
software 
Khansa et al. [17] JMIS Cyberloafing Social learning theory Longitudinal survey Internet 
Liang et al. [18] ISR IT compliance Regulatory focus 
theory 
Survey ERP 
Lowry et al. [19] JAIS Internal computer 
abuse 
Deterrence theory; 
rational choice theory 
Literature review NONE 
Menard et al. 
[20] 
JMIS Information security 
behavior 
Protection motivation 
theory; self-
determination theory 
Experiment NONE 
Moody et al. [21] MISQ Information security 
policy compliance 
The unified model of 
information security 
policy compliance 
Survey Information security 
policy 
Moores and 
Chang [22] 
MISQ Software piracy The four-component 
model of morality 
A scenario-based 
survey 
Software 
Peace et al. [23] JMIS Software piracy Theory of planned 
behavior; expected 
utility theory; 
deterrence theory 
Survey Software 
Posey et al. [24] JMIS Information security 
threats 
Protection motivation 
theory 
Survey NONE 
Puhakainen and MISQ Employee Elaboration likelihood Action research Information systems 
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Authors Journal Topic Theory Research Design Technology 
Siponen [25] noncompliance with 
information systems 
security policies 
model; universal 
constructive 
instructional theory 
security policy 
Ragu-Nathan et 
al. [26] 
ISR Technostress Stress Survey Computers at work 
Sarker et al. [27] ISR Work-life conflict Border theory Case study; survey Globally distributed 
software development 
Siponen and 
Vance [28] 
MISQ Employees’ failure to 
comply with IS 
security policies 
Deterrence theory A hypothetical 
scenario method 
NONE 
Smith et al. [29] MISQ IS security compliance Circuits of power 
framework 
Survey; interview; 
observation; focus 
group 
NONE 
Sojer et al. [30] JMIS Unethical 
programming behavior 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
Survey Programming 
software 
Spears and Barki 
[31] 
MISQ IS security risk 
management 
Buy-in theory; system 
quality theory; 
emergent interactions 
theory 
Interview; survey NONE 
Stein et al. [32] MISQ Nonconforming use 
patterns 
A coping model of user 
adaptation 
An in-depth field 
study 
A software package 
Tams et al. [33] JAIS Interruption-based 
technostress 
Theories of stress and 
cognitive aging 
Experiment NONE 
Vance et al. [34] JAIS Information security 
behavior 
Theory of planned 
behavior; context-
updating theory 
Experiment NONE 
Vance et al. [35] MISQ System access-policy 
violations 
Accountability theory A scenario-based 
factorial survey 
method  
A records system 
containing sensitive 
information 
Wang et al. [36] MISQ Insider threats Routine activity theory An analysis of log 
data  
 
An enterprise single 
sign-on (ESSO) 
system 
Warkentin et al. 
[37] 
JAIS Secure IT behaviors Fear appeal theory Experiment NONE 
Willison and 
Warkentin [38] 
MISQ Employee computer 
abuse 
Security action cycle 
framework 
NONE NONE 
Wright et al. [39] ISR Phishing Persuasion and 
motivation theory 
A field experiment E-mail 
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